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Abstract
A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that cooperation should be reinforced when conditional
cooperators are more likely to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that cooperation should fare
better in highly clustered networks such as cliques than in networks with low clustering such as random networks. To test
this hypothesis, we conducted a series of web-based experiments, in which 24 individuals played a local public goods game
arranged on one of five network topologies that varied between disconnected cliques and a random regular graph. In
contrast with previous theoretical work, we found that network topology had no significant effect on average contributions.
This result implies either that individuals are not conditional cooperators, or else that cooperation does not benefit from
positive reinforcement between connected neighbors. We then tested both of these possibilities in two subsequent series
of experiments in which artificial seed players were introduced, making either full or zero contributions. First, we found that
although players did generally behave like conditional cooperators, they were as likely to decrease their contributions in
response to low contributing neighbors as they were to increase their contributions in response to high contributing
neighbors. Second, we found that positive effects of cooperation were contagious only to direct neighbors in the network.
In total we report on 113 human subjects experiments, highlighting the speed, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness of web-
based experiments over those conducted in physical labs.
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Introduction
Why, and under what conditions, presumptively selfish
individuals cooperate is a prevailing question in social science
that has stimulated an extraordinary range of explanations, many
of which have focused on the strategic benefits of cooperation. For
example, although displays of altruism may appear to run counter
to an individual’s self-interest, it is possible to show that if one
assumes that individuals possess sufficiently strong other-regarding
preferences, then altruism may in fact convey selfish benefits as
well [1]. Moreover in a social context, behavior that appears
purely altruistic may also accrue individual benefits either because
others explicitly reward pro-social behavior [2,3] or punish selfish
behavior [4–7]. Finally, individuals may be rewarded indirectly for
cooperating, either because a good reputation conveys other
transactional benefits [8], or because altruistic behavior can be
viewed as a signal of reproductive fitness [9].
In addition to explanations that focus on individual strategies, a
longstanding idea is that cooperative behavior might arise as a
consequence of the population structure itself [10]. Although
initially proposed in the context of evolutionary biology, this idea
has particular relevance for social dilemmas among human actors,
where the total population is large, but the effects of any one
individual’s actions fall disproportionately on a relatively small set
of neighbors determined either by spatial or social proximity. For
example, smog or acid rain causing pollutants disproportionately
impact geographically proximate populations; thus one can think
of the game as playing out on some approximation of a spatial
lattice. Correspondingly, the benefit derived from social network-
ing sites (e.g. Facebook) is highly dependent on the activities and
contributions of one’s immediate social acquaintances, whose
identities in turn depend some complicated mixture of social and
spatial distance [11]. Because in either case an individual’s
neighbors are themselves connected to others, who are in turn
connected to others still, and so on, the dynamics of social
dilemmas can be thought of as taking place on extended networks
[12,13]. In these settings, outcomes of interest, such as aggregate
levels of cooperation, plausibly depend on the structure of the
network as well as on the strategies of the individuals in the
population [14].
There are two main reasons to suspect that cooperation should
depend on network structure. The first reason is that many
theoretical models of social dilemmas assume that cooperation is
conditional, in the sense that an individual will only cooperate on
the condition that its partners are also cooperating. Arguably the
clearest example of the principle of conditional cooperation is the
celebrated Tit-For-Tat strategy, which has consistently been
shown to outperform more exploitative strategies in a range of
simulation studies, in large part because it performs well when
interacting with other cooperative strategies [15]. In addition,
related strategies have also been proposed that generalize the idea
of conditional cooperation to multi-player settings [16,17], usually
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cooperate if at least X of my neighbors cooperated last round, else
I will defect.’’ Regardless of the specifics of the rule, the
implication of these results for networks is that networks
characterized by high levels of local clustering [18], meaning that
an individual’s neighbors are also likely to be neighbors of each
other, ought to sustain higher aggregate levels of cooperation than
populations in which individuals are randomly mixed [19]. Put
another way, local reinforcement would imply that when an
individual’s neighbors also interact with each other, they are in a
better position to reinforce one another’s pro-social behavior, and
so may be expected to resist ‘‘invasion’’ by defecting strategies
better than when each neighbor interacts with a different set of
others.
The second reason to suspect that network structure should
impact cooperation is that cooperation in networks might be
‘‘contagious.’’ Specifically, if A is a conditional cooperator
surrounded mostly by cooperating neighbors, A will cooperate
more; but then A’s increased cooperation may cause its remaining
neighbors to cooperate more as well. These neighbors may in turn
cause their neighbors to cooperate more as well, and so on, leading
to a cascade of cooperation that sustains itself over multiple steps.
In fact, recently it has been claimed that cooperation is
characterized by a ‘‘three degrees of influence’’ rule [20], meaning
that an individual who increases his or her level of cooperation can
positively impact the contribution of an individual who is three
steps removed from them in the network. Because the number of
individuals who can be reached within three degrees of a
cooperating individual will in general depend on the non-local
structure of the network [18], the presence of social contagion
would imply that network features other than local clustering
should also impact aggregate cooperation levels.
Although these heuristic arguments suggest that network
structure plausibly impacts cooperation, two other arguments
suggest the opposite conclusion. First, even if it is true that
unconditional cooperators will benefit from preferential interac-
tion and hence network clustering, conditional cooperation is
known to cut both ways, leading as easily to defection as to
cooperation [15]. In effect, the assertion that preferential
interaction among conditional cooperators will also aid coopera-
tion makes the additional implicit assumption that individuals
initially cooperate—an assumption that may or may not hold in
practice. Second, the contagion argument implicitly assumes
relatively ‘‘tight’’ coupling between neighbors. In coordination
games, for example, paired individuals have very clear incentives
to choose actions to coordinate with their network neighbors. For
example, if A chooses an action that does not coordinate with a
one of its neighbors B, then B will have a clear incentive to change
its action to accommodate A. If B changes its action, then another
of B’s neighbors, say C, who is not directly connected to A will
nevertheless have an equally clear incentive to coordinate with B
as well. In coordination games, therefore, it is easy to see how the
influence of one player’s action can propagate along chains of
intermediaries to affect non-neighbors. And because conditionally
cooperative strategies have something of the flavor of coordination
games, it is tempting to infer that they lead to the same kind of
contagion—indeed it is precisely this intuition that studies like [20]
appear to support. However, it is much less clear that individual
strategies for resolving social dilemmas do in fact exhibit the same
kind of coupling as observed in coordination games, or even
should in theory.
In addition to these theoretical arguments, simulation studies of
games over networks have also reached mixed conclusions with
respect to the impact of network structure on contributions. For
example, a number of simulation studies of social dilemmas on
spatial lattices [21,22], and more recently on networks [16,23],
have found that under certain conditions network structure
impacts levels. It should be noted, however, that all these results
depend on numerous modeling assumptions regarding the
behavioral strategies of individual players. Because so many
strategies are conceivable, and because the success of conditional
cooperation depends on what other strategies are present, it is
ultimately inconclusive what can be learned from simulation
studies about how real human players will interact in networks.
Finally, experimental evidence concerning the role of network
structure is also inconclusive. Although a number of ‘‘networked
games’’ experiments have been conducted in recent years using
human subjects [24–27], they have generally focused on other
games, like graph coloring [26], consensus [25], economic
exchange [24], and diffusion of social influence [28]. Many of
these experiments have found that network structure dramatically
impacts collective behavior, consistent with the arguments above.
Because all these games differ from one another in subtle but
important ways, and because none of them precisely resemble
social dilemmas, it remains unclear how these findings can be
extended to the question of cooperation on networks. Meanwhile,
the extensive experimental literature that explicitly addresses
cooperation has largely focused on interactions between pairs [29],
or within small, completely connected groups [30–32]. To our
knowledge, only one experiment has been conducted to test
directly for the effects of networks structure, by Cassar [27], who
concluded that ‘small-world’ networks (i.e. with high local
clustering and short global path lengths) support higher contribu-
tion levels in a linear public goods game than randomly connected
networks—consistent with the intuition outlined above. For
reasons we outline below, however, Cassar’s findings were
ultimately inconclusive.
As a result of the ambiguous and even conflicting conclusions of
previous theoretical, simulation and experimental results, there is a
clear need for clarifying experimental evidence. The main
substantive contribution of this paper is to investigate the
relationship between network structure and cooperation in a
series of networked public goods experiments. The experiments we
report on were conducted over the World Wide Web using the
popular crowdsourcing platform, Amazon Mechanical Turk
(http://www.mturk.com). AMT is a web-based labor market
originally created to facilitate crowdsourcing [33] of tasks, called
human intelligence tasks, or HITs, that are easier for humans than
for machines—such as, image labeling, sentiment analysis, or
classification of URLs. In addition to its role as a labor market,
however, AMT can also be thought of as a convenient pool of
subjects willing to participate in laboratory-style behavioral
experiments. Mechanical Turk and other web-based experimental
platforms are becoming increasingly popular with behavioral
science researchers, in part because they allow experiments to be
run faster and more cheaply, and in part because they afford
access to potentially a much broader cross-section of the
population than is typical of university-based lab experiments
[34–38]. A second contribution of this work, therefore, is to
advance the scope of behavioral experiments conducted on AMT
to include networked games and more generally, games where all
players play simultaneously.
Results
We conducted a total of 113 experiments on AMT over a
period of 6 months. In each of these experiments participants
played a widely studied variant of a social dilemma, called a public
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games last for a number rounds, where in each round individuals
make voluntary contributions to a common pool. The pool is then
augmented in some manner, reflecting the added benefits of the
public good. After augmentation the pool is then redistributed to
the players, where all players receive an equal share regardless of
their contributions. Although many specific variants of this general
class of games have been proposed [40], we studied a variant of a
standard one in the experimental literature [30,31,41] defined by
the payoff function pi~ei{ciz
a
n
Xn
j~1 cj where pi is the payoff
to individual i, ei is i’s endowment, ci is i’s voluntary contribution,
a is the amount by which collective contributions are multiplied
before being redistributed, and n is the group size. Critically, when
1vavn, meaning that the marginal per capita return M~
a
n
lies
in the range 0vMv1 players face a social dilemma in the sense
that social welfare is maximized when all individuals contribute
the maximum amount, but players have a selfish incentive to free
ride on the contributions of others.
Experimental Design
In contrast with standard public goods games, in which
participants’ contributions are shared among members of the
same group, here participants are arranged in a network. To
reflect this change, players’ payoffs are subject to the modified
payoff function pi~ei{ciz
a
kz1
X
j[C(i) cj, where in place of
the summation over the entire group of n players, payoffs are
instead summed over C(i), the network neighborhood of i (which
we define to include i itself), and k is the vertex degree (all nodes in
all networks have the same degree). Therefore, i’s contributions
are, in effect, divided equally among the edges of the graph that
are incident on i, where payoffs are correspondingly summed over
i’s edges. Aside from this change, our experimental design was
kept as similar as possible to previous work, in order to make
comparisons possible. Specifically, we ran each experiment for 10
rounds, where the first two rounds each lasted 45 seconds and all
subsequent rounds lasted 30 seconds. In each round, each
participant received e~10 after which they were required to
nominate a contribution 0ƒciƒe to the common pool. The pool
was then augmented and then redistributed to the players, where
all players received an equal share regardless of their contribu-
tions, as described in the payoff function above. At the end of each
round, each player received the following information, which is
identical to the information given to the players in [32]: (a) their
contribution for that round, (b) the contributions of each of their
neighbors for that round, and (c) their own cumulative payoff up to
that point. The information visible to players is shown in Figure 1.
As shown in Figure 2, we chose networks that spanned a wide
range of possible structures between a collection of four
disconnected cliques at one extreme, and a regular random graph
at the other. All networks comprised n~24 players, each with
constant vertex degree k~5; however, they varied with respect to
three frequently studied structural parameters, summarized in
Table 1: (a) the clustering coefficient C~
2
n
Xn
i~i
Ki
k(k{1)
where
Figure 1. Screen shot of the experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.g001
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(b) the average path length L~SdijT where the average distance
between all pairs of nodes is taken over each connected
component; and (c) the diameter D~maxdij, which is the
distance between the farthest two nodes. The clustering coefficient
of node i is computed by dividing the number of triangles incident
on i by the number of triangles possible given i’s degree. The
clustering coefficient of a network, which is the average clustering
coefficient over all nodes, is therefore a local measure of structure
that captures the extent to which the neighbors of i are also
neighbors of each other. The average path length and diameter,
by contrast, are global network measures that quantify the extent
to which effects can propagate along chains of network ties.
In spite of these structural differences, we note that from the
perspective of the players, all positions in all networks will seem
indistinguishable—players always see themselves interacting with a
local network of five others, as in Figure 1. Why then, might we
expect the network structure to make any difference? The answer
is that although players always play with k neighbors, the
relationship between their neighbors changes as a function of
the network. When the network in question is a clique—a set of
kz1 nodes in which every node is connected to every other—our
formulation reduces to the standard design in which the group size
n~kz1. For a general network, however, n and k can be
specified more or less independently (except that n§kz1), and
the connectivity between an individual i’s neighbors can also vary
dramatically. In a clique, that is, every neighbor of i is connected
to every other neighbor, whereas in a random graph, i’s neighbors
will be connected to each other with probability roughly k=n
which tends to 0 when n&k. We note that our design differs from
previous studies that have compared so-called ‘‘partner’’ vs.
‘‘stranger’’ conditions [32], where in the former condition
individuals play with the same partners for multiple rounds,
whereas in the latter condition they are randomly rematched on
each round. In our design, individuals always play with the same
people as in the partner condition. It is the relationship between
partners that is different across different network structures. If
the ‘‘reinforcement’’ hypothesis, outlined above, is correct, there-
fore, the actions of an individual’s neighbors ought to be
dependent on the actions of their neighbors, and hence the
experience of the focal individual will depend on the density of
interaction between his or her immediate neighbors. Likewise, if
the ‘‘contagion’’ hypothesis is correct, the focal individual’s
experience will depend in addition on the actions of individuals
Figure 2. The five networks used in the experiment. (A) four cliques of six players each; (B) two connected components of twelve players
constructed by choosing one pair of players in each of two of the cliques in A, and swapping partners; (C) cycle of near-cliques constructed by
choosing a pair in each of the four cliques in A and deterministically swapping an edge with a pair from another clique so as form a cycle; (D) ‘‘small
world’’ type network formed by swapping four randomly chosen pairs of edges from C; (E) a random regular graph in which all nodes have the same
degree k~5. In all cases, the filled in nodes were used as seed nodes in the intervention experiments (see text for details). Each seed node is color-
coded, and nodes connected directly to a given seed are outlined with the same color. All nodes in all networks are directly connected to exactly one
seed node, except for Random Regular where two nodes are each directly connected to two seed nodes (green double circles) and two nodes are not
directly connected to any seed node (orange rectangles).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.g002
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was specifically designed to highlight the importance both of local
reinforcement and contagion.
Recruiting and Retention
The Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) community comprises
two types of actors: requesters and workers. Requesters can be
individuals or corporations, and can list jobs along with a specified
compensation. Workers, also known as ‘‘turkers,’’ are paid by
requesters to complete individual tasks. When choosing a task to
workon,workers arepresented with a list of jobs that aresubdivided
into HITs. Each job contains the title of the job being offered, the
reward being offered per HIT, and the number of HITs available
for that job.Workers canclickon a link to view a brief descriptionof
the task, or canrequest a preview of the HIT. In our case, we posted
the experiment as a HIT and recruited workers as subjects to do the
experiment. After seeing the preview, workers could choose to
accept the HIT, at which point the work was officially assigned to
them and they could begin completing the task. HITs range widely
in size and nature, requiring from seconds to hoursto complete, and
compensation varies accordingly, but is typically on the order of
$0.01–$0.10 per HIT. Currently, several hundred requests may be
available on any given day, representing tens of thousands of HITs
(i.e. a single request may comprise hundreds or even thousands of
individual HITs). AMT also provides a convenient API for
transferring payments from requesters to workers.
Although AMT and other web-based experimental platforms
are becoming increasingly popular with behavioral science
researchers, the bulk of previous work has relied on experimental
designs that are asynchronous, in the sense that they do not
require a large group of subjects to participate at the same time. In
[42], for example, participants arrived sequentially, and only saw
information about the behavior of previous participants, while in
[43], at most pairs of participants were required to be present
simultaneously. In our experiment, however we required all
players to participate simultaneously—a problem that is solved in
physical labs by announcing official start times and supervising
experiments with trained proctors. To resolve this problem, we
instituted a number of web-specific experimental procedures, as
described next and in more detail in [38].
The Waiting Room. Because it was impossible to assure that
participants arrived at precisely the same time, and also because
different participants required more or less time to read the
instructions and pass the quiz (see below), we created a virtual
‘‘waiting room,’’ similar to [44]. Once they had accepted the HIT
and passed the quiz, participants saw a screen informing them that
the experiment had not yet filled, along with how many remaining
players were required. Once all positions had been filled,
participants in the waiting room were informed that the game
was about to commence.
The Panel. In a series of preliminary experiments, we learned
that simply posting the HIT on AMT was insufficient to fill
networks of size n~24 in a reasonable time, resulting in
participants abandoning the waiting room and the HIT being
terminated. To alleviate this problem, we ran a series of
experiments with n~4, for which waiting times were reasonable,
and then at end of each experiment, allowed participants to opt-in
to being notified of future runs of our experiment. In this manner,
we created a standing panel of 152 players who had played
previously and who understood the instructions (i.e. they qualified
as experienced players, consistent with previous work [31]). All
113 experiments reported here were conducted using this panel,
the self-reported demographic composition of which is reported in
Table 2. The evening before any experiments were to be held, we
Table 1. Properties of the five network topologies.
Cliques
Paired
Cliques Cycle
Small
World
Random
Regular
Clustering
Coefficient (C)
1.00 0.80 0.60 0.41 0.09
Average Path
Length (L)
1.00 1.81 2.54 2.23 2.01
Diameter (D) ?? 54 3
Return on
Investment (ROI)
1.04 1.09 1.38 0.80 1.00
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.t002
Table 2. Self-reported demographic information of panel
members.
Gender Male 61.8
Female 35.5
Did Not Answer 2.7
Average Age 32
Highest degree or level
of school completed
High School 21.1
Associates 9.2
Bachelors 42.1
Masters 18.4
Doctorate 3.9
Professional 3.9
Did Not Answer 1.4
Race Asian 26.3
Black or African American 1.3
American Indian or Alaskan Native 0.7
White 69.7
Did Not Answer 2.0
Marital Status Divorced 4.6
Now Married 42.1
Never Married 49.3
Separated 2.0
Did Not Answer 2.0
Total Annual Household
Income
v 10k 13.8
10k–20k 13.2
20k–30k 9.9
30k–40k 12.5
40k–50k 15.1
50k–60k 7.2
60k–70k 5.3
70k–80k 4.6
80k–90k 2.0
90k–100k 2.6
100k–150k 6.6
w 150k 5.9
Did Not Answer 1.4
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.t001
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what time the experiments would be, typically at 11am, 1pm, 3pm
and 5pm EST, although other times of day were used in a few
instances. We also posted the time of the next days experiments on
turkernation.com, a bulletin board site for turkers. At the
announced times, participants would log in to AMT, where the
first 24 players to read the following instructions and pass the quiz
at the end of it were allowed to enter the experiment.
Handling Dropouts. In spite of these precautions, individual
participants would occasionally fail to enter a contribution on one
or more turns, or leave the game entirely. In rare instances, a
participant who had accepted the HIT and passed the quiz did not
participate at all in the game. To handle these circumstances, we
adopted the following rules: 1) If a player had entered at least one
contribution, and if they subsequently failed to enter a
contribution, the system would automatically enter the same
contribution as their previous round. 2) If a player did not enter an
initial contribution, the system would random choose a
contribution of either 0 or 10 for that player (roughly 70% of
the contributions during round 1 where either 0 or 10). To avoid
biasing our results, we only used data from a given realization if at
least 90% of the contributions in the entire experiment were
actually made by human players.
Calibrating the AMT population
Before proceeding with our main results, we first address two
legitimate sources of skepticism regarding web-based experiments.
First, subjects playing at home or at work may behave
systematically differently from those playing in a physical lab;
thus the results obtained in a web environment may not be
comparable to those obtained in lab-based studies. To address this
issue, we conducted a series of 24 preliminary experiments that
were designed to replicate the conditions of a previous lab-based
study [32]. Specifically, we arranged the players in completely
connected groups (cliques) of n~4 (equivalent to k~3) and set
M~0:4. One difference between our design and [32] was that
per-round endowments in our experiment were 10 points, instead
of 20. Normalizing for these different endowments, however,
Figure 3A shows striking agreement between the two sets of results,
where we note that qualitatively similar average contribution levels
have also been found in other experimental studies [31]. A second
issue is that the compensation rates in AMT are substantially lower
than in traditional lab experiments; thus one might suspect that
subjects are correspondingly less motivated to play seriously.
Previous studies such as [45] have shown that for these types of
economic experiments, paying a low or high rate does not have a
large impact on results as long as the payoff amount has a nonzero
dependency on performance. Nevertheless, we conducted an
additional series of 16 experiments which alternated the
compensation between $0.01 per point and $0.005 per point
(participants were also paid a fixed up-front fee of $0.50 for
accepting the task and passing the quiz). As Figure 3B shows,
contribution levels for both compensation levels were similar,
which is also consistent with prior work [45]. We therefore
conclude that neither compensation rates nor context significantly
affected the behavior of subjects in our games, relative to previous
studies. Thus reassured, we now proceed to discuss our main
results, which concern behavior on networks.
Testing for Effects of Network Structure
In the first set of network experiments all positions in the
network were filled by human players recruited from AMT.
Because individual contributions tended to vary considerably from
one experiment to the next, and different players were likely to
play at different times of day, we conducted multiple realizations of
the experiment for each topology (see Table 3). The order and
timing of experiments was randomly varied between realizations.
In total, we conducted 23 experiments over a period of 8 weeks.
Figure 4A shows the average contribution for each round, for each
of the five topologies. Visually, the average contribution follows a
very similar pattern regardless of the network topology. This result
is confirmed by a Kruskal-Wallis test [46] on the five distributions
(one for each topology) of contributions for each round, which
found no significant differences (the smallest P-value is for round 8:
H=6.43, df=4, P=0.17). Figure 4A also shows that contribution
curves that start higher, relative to other curves, tend to stay above
the other curves over the course of the experiments; yet, clearly the
first round contributions are random and unrelated to the
topology of the network. To see the differences between topologies
more directly, therefore, Figure 4B shows the same contribution
curves as in 4A, but shifted vertically in order that they have the
same initial value. As can be seen, eliminating these initial
difference further diminishes the already small differences between
topologies.
Figure 3. Calibrating the AMT platform. (A) Comparison of contributions for identical linear public goods games conducted on Amazon
Mechanical Turk and in a physical lab [32]. (B) Contributions for different compensation levels. In both panels error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.g003
Cooperation in Networked Public Goods Experiments
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e16836In addition to considering differences in aggregate contribu-
tions, we also checked for differences between topologies both at
the level of individual nodes, and for individual ‘‘groups’’ defined
as the nodes that are assigned to the same cliques in topology 1 (see
colors in Figure 2). As Figure 2 indicates, these groups become
progressively less meaningful as the clustering coefficient dimin-
ishes: in the Random Regular topology, two nodes in the same
group (same color) are no more likely to be connected than nodes
of different groups. In spite of these topological differences,
however, Figure 5 indicates that they do not impact contributions;
specifically, the fraction of groups contributing at least X in a given
round is similar for all topologies, and over all rounds. Finally,
Figure 6 shows the full distribution of individual level contributions
for the five topologies (color coded) over all ten rounds. Although
all distributions change dramatically over the course of the game,
reflecting the average decline in contributions seen in Figure 4, the
changes are similar for all topologies. Thus we conclude that
topology does not exert a noticeable impact on contributions at
any level: individual, group, or aggregate.
Comparison of Results with Cassar (2007). Cassar [27]
conducted a total of 11, 18-player prisoner dilemma experiments
on networks of players, where the networks were varied between
the following three topologies: a ‘‘local’’ network on which
individuals were arranged on a cycle, and each individual was
connected to their two nearest and two next-nearest neighbors (i.e.
k~ k k~4 for all nodes); a ‘‘small-world’’ network in which a small
fraction of the edges in the cycle were rewired (hence  k k~4, but
individual k varied); and a ‘‘random’’ network in which individuals
were randomly connected (again,  k k~4, but individual k varied).
Three realizations of each topology were tested; thus clustering
coefficient varied between 0:06ƒCƒ0:5, depending on topology,
and path length varied between 2:03ƒLƒ2:67, where the local
topology had the highest C and L, the random topology had the
lowest, and the small-world topology was intermediate. Cassar
found that cooperation in the small-world topology was
significantly lower than either the local or the random topology
(Table 5, p. 224 in [27]). She also found that in a logit model, the
terms for C and L were negative and positive respectively, and
both were significant (Table 10, p. 227 [27]).
At first glance, these findings appear to contradict our own;
however, we note that the differences reported as significant in
Cassars Table 5 are between cumulative contributions, over the 80
rounds of the experiments. Yet as noted above, and also by Cassar
(see her Footnote 13), if the contributions in one realization start at
a higher level than other realizations, they tend to stay above the
other realizations for the duration of the experiment. This suggests
that contributions across consecutive rounds are unlikely to be
independent. Combining contributions over many rounds there-
fore artificially amplifies the differences, leading to the appearance
of statistical significance where none may exist. In fact, as Table 5
in [27] itself makes clear, the final (and also average) difference
between topologies is roughly the same as the initial difference
(period 1–20); thus essentially all of the difference can be explained
in term of initial contributions, which are by construction
unrelated to the network topology. Second, the significance of
the NetworkClustering and NetworkLength coefficients in the
PD1 logit model (Table 10 in [27]) is marginal and disappeared
when other factors, such as the % cooperation in the previous
experiment (PD2) or dummy variables for the session (PD3) were
included. If simply controlling for the session in which a game was
conducted eliminates the significance of a coefficient, then it would
seem that any claims to significance ought to be regarded with
caution. On closer inspection, therefore, Cassar’s results are
Table 3. The breakdown of realizations per topology is given.
Paired Small Random
Cliques Cliques Cycle World Regular
All Human 4 3 8 4 4
Cooperative Seeds, Cover 3 2 4 2 2
Defecting Seeds, Cover 2 2 9 2 2
Cooperative Seeds,
Concentrated
N/A 4 5 5 6
The larger number of cycle topology experiments was due to the presence of
two outliers: experiments in which uncharacteristically high contributions were
registered. The effect of these outliers was to greatly increase the size of the
error bars for that topology, thus more realizations were required.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.t003
Figure 4. Average contributions per round for each of the five network topologies shown in Figure 2. (A) Raw contributions. Error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals.(B) Contribution curves shifted vertically so that they all start at the same point.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.g004
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levels between network structures are not significant.
Although Cassar’s results on how network structure impacts
contribution levels in public goods games may be ambiguous, they
do support our claim that the theoretical arguments above
[16,21–23] have led researchers to suspect that network structure
should matter. Specifically, intuition and simulation results suggest
that when conditional cooperators are allowed to interact
preferentially, i.e. in networks that exhibit high clustering, they
ought to reinforce each other, thereby sustaining higher
contributions for longer than in randomly connected networks
which have low clustering. Likewise, the contagion argument
suggests that clusters of high contributors ought to exert a positive
impact on the contributions of neighbors who are not in the
cluster, thereby promoting the spread of cooperation. If in fact,
network structure does not impact contributions, then one or both
of these two arguments must be invalid. To differentiate between
these possible explanations, we conducted two additional series of
experiments, which we describe in turn.
Testing for Conditional Cooperation
In the first series, comprising 30 experiments over 4 weeks, we
followed the same design as above, but with the key difference that
in each experiment four nodes were selected, one from each group
(indicated with a filled circle in Figure 2), and their contributions
were all artificially fixed either at 10 (the ‘‘cooperative’’ condition)
or 0 (the ‘‘defection’’ condition) for all rounds. We emphasize, that
these players were played by a computer, not by subsidizing real
players, where we did not explicitly disclose to subjects that their
neighbors might not be played by other human players.
Behavioral scientists of different traditions have varying attitudes
with respect deceptive manipulations: experimental economists
view them as unacceptable in principle, whereas psychologists
practice them when the research benefit outweighs any harm
caused to subjects. In our case, subjects were exposed to minimal
harm; thus we viewed the benefit of being able to establish clear
causal relations as justifying the manipulation. Potentially the issue
could have been avoided by including a statement in the
instructions to participants to the effect that ‘‘from time to time
certain positions may be played by automated agents rather than
humans.’’ However, we do not believe that the inclusion of such a
statement would have affected the results.
Following the above procedure, we were able test the
conditional cooperator hypothesis by directly measuring the
positive/negative influence of unconditional cooperators/defectors
on their immediate neighbors. We note that with the exception of
the random regular network, the seed players were arranged in
order to cover the network, meaning that each human player was
adjacent to precisely one seed player; in addition, each human
player was connected via two-step paths to all four seed players (in
the random regular case, a perfect cover arrangement did not exist
for the selected network; thus a close approximation was used
instead). An advantage of this arrangement, which we call the
‘‘cover’’ condition, is that all human players were subjected to the
same experimentally manipulated influence, both direct and
indirect.
Figure 7A shows that in all topologies, the presence of
cooperating seeds stimulated consistently higher aggregate contri-
butions from the remaining 20 players, while the presence of
defecting seeds had the opposite effect. Possessing a high (or low)
contributing neighbor therefore did increase (or decrease) the
average contribution levels; thus our subjects were indeed
behaving as conditional cooperators. Nevertheless, Figure 7B
shows that the effect of the seed players was not consistently bigger
in the graphs with the highest clustering. For example the effect of
the seed nodes in the Cliques network, which had the maximum
number of triangles incident on each node, was very similar to the
effect of the seeds nodes in the Random Regular network, which
had fewer than 1/10th as many triangles. This result implies that
two nodes that form a triangle with a cooperating (or defecting)
seed do not have an appreciably larger (or smaller) average
contribution level then two disconnected nodes with a cooperating
(or defecting) seed neighbor in common. Mutual reinforcement of
the contributions among the neighbors of a seed node is largely
absent, whether or not there is an edge between the neighbors.
Is there in fact any effect of increasing the number of triangles in
the network? To answer this question, Figure 8 compares the
difference in contributions of pairs of players that (a) are adjacent
versus not adjacent, and (b) share a positive or negative seed as a
neighbor versus no neighboring seed. Comparing the left column
to the right column shows that adding an edge to a disconnected
pair of edges increased the similarity between their contribution
levels. It also shows that completing a triangle between two human
players and a seed node also increased the similarity of the
contributions of the humans. Thus, increasing the number of
triangles in the network did indeed increase coordination within
the neighborhoods of the seeds. We emphasize, however, that the
coordinating influence of triangles cuts both ways by increasing
contributions in the presence of cooperating neighbors and
diminishing them in the presence of defecting neighbors; thus
increased coordination among triangles of players does not
correspond to increased contribution levels. Put another way,
players do cooperate conditionally, but the negative effects of
conditional cooperation counteract the positive effects such that
the net result is independent of local clustering.
Testing for Contagion
As noted above, another possible explanation for the lack of
impact of network topology on aggregate contributions is the
absence of contagion. That is, even if players do behave as
conditional cooperators, both with respect to the artificial seeds
and also the other neighbors of seeds, possibly these effects are not
strong enough to propagate beyond the immediate neighborhood
of a cooperation seed. Unfortunately, the above experiment allows
us to draw only limited conclusions regarding contagion. Since the
cover arrangement of seeds meant that all human players were
subjected to the same potential influence, both direct and indirect,
we did not experimentally manipulate the level of positive/
negative influence at different distances from human players.
To further test for the possibility of contagion, therefore, we
conducted a third series of 20 experiments over 2 weeks, in which
we kept the number of unconditionally cooperating seeds constant
at four per network (we did not introduce unconditional defectors
in these experiments), but concentrated them together into two
adjacent pairs (see Figure 9). This arrangement of seeds, which we
call the ‘‘concentrated’’ condition, therefore exposed some human
players to two unconditional cooperators as immediate neighbors,
while others were not exposed to any seeds directly, but were
connected indirectly to the seeds via a human intermediary. Since
the Cliques topology did not allow for this type of arrangement we
excluded it from these experiments. If positive contagion were
present in the network, we would expect to see nodes at distance
Figure 5. Fraction of groups with average contribution at least X, where 1ƒXƒ10.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.g005
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human (i.e. no seeds) condition. Moreover, the premise of
conditional cooperation would also lead us to expect that
immediate neighbors would increase their contributions relative
to the cover-seed condition.
Surprisingly, our results contradicted both these expectations.
First we found that nodes who were directly connected to two
cooperating seed nodes contributed more than players who were
not attached to any seed nodes, but less than players who were
attached to only one seed node (both computed from previous
experiments) as shown in Figure 10A. These results suggest that
although many players do respond positively to the introduction of
unconditional cooperators, the presence of too many uncondi-
tional cooperators invites free riding. Conditional cooperation,
that is, appears to be subject to at least two distinct conditions that
are in tension with one another: on the one hand, individuals do
not want to contribute unless others are contributing; but on the
other hand, if others contribute too much, the temptation to free
ride overrides their inclination to reciprocate. In spite of this result,
it is nevertheless the case that immediate neighbors of cooperating
seeds did on average contribute more than in the no-seed
condition. Assuming that the remaining players (i.e. at distance
two from the seeds) also cooperate conditionally, one would expect
that the increased contributions associated with the neighbors of a
fully contributing seed would generate contagious effects leading to
increased contributions among these nodes as well. Yet these
effects were not apparent. Quite to the contrary, in fact, Figure 10B
shows that the two-step neighbors of the cooperating seeds
contributed slightly less than the nodes in the corresponding
network positions contributed in the all-human experiments.
Testing for Learning Effects. To check that this
unexpected reduction in contributions did not reflect a
systematic overall shift from higher to lower contributions over
the course of dozens of experiments involving our panel, we ran an
additional series of all-human experiments, finding that average
contributions had, if anything, increased slightly relative to the
earlier round of all-human experiments (see Figure 11A). We also
studied average contributions as a function of the number of
games played by individual subjects, finding that experienced
players who have played as many as 40 games did not contribute
on average, more or less than inexperienced players (see
Figure 11B). Moreover, we tested for selection effects by
comparing the complete history of average contribution levels of
those who chose to play many times to the overall subject pool and
did not find a significant difference. Thus we conclude that the
reduced contributions observed in the concentrated seed
experiments are not explainable either in terms of a systemic
over-time shift in player behavior, the presence of experienced
players contributing less, or a higher return rate of more
cooperative players. We also note that although experienced
players have been used in previous experiments [31], it is unusual
to allow subjects to play upwards of 30 times over a period of
months. Previously it has been unclear whether or not such players
would learn over time to play differently, thereby systematically
biasing the results. Figure 11 is therefore reassuring in that it shows
no evidence of such a systematic bias.
Comparison of Results with Fowler and Christakis
(2010). Finally, we note that our finding that positive
contagion does not occur in public goods games on networks
appears to contradict a recent claim by Fowler and Christakis [20]
mentioned earlier. The authors claim that cooperative cascades
take place on networks of individuals playing a linear public goods
game, and that evidence of contagion persists for up to three steps,
leading them to hypothesize a ‘‘three degrees of influence’’ rule.
We note, however, an important difference between the networks
studied by Fowler and Christakis and those that we have studied
here. Specifically, Fowler and Christakis reanalyzed data from
Fehr and Gachter [32] (the same results that we replicated in our
preliminary experiments described above) in which groups of n~4
players were randomly reassigned to new groups after each round.
Figure 6. Distributions of individual level contributions across topologies. The distributions vary only slightly as the topology is changed.
One realization of the Paired Cliques topology was an outlier; it had a higher then normal number of full contributors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.g006
Figure 7. Contributions for cover-seed experiment. (A) Average contribution per round for the cooperating and defecting conditions averaged
over all realizations and all topologies. (B) Overall average contribution for each topology under the cooperating, defecting and all human conditions.
The clustering coefficient for each network is listed in parenthesis. In both panels error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.g007
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with same set of neighbors each turn, in [20] each individual
appears r times (where r is the number of rounds of the
experiment) and plays with a different set of neighbors each
time. As a result, the measure of network distance in [20] does not
map precisely to the conventional meaning of network distance,
which is the meaning that we have adopted here, but rather refers
at least in part to the relation between an individual’s present and
past states. Although this unconventional definition of distance
makes the two sets of results difficult to compare, the main finding
in [20], that individuals who belonged to higher contributing
groups in round t{1 contributed, on average, more in round t,
seems consistent with our observation that initially high
contributions tend to persist over time. We also note, however,
that it was precisely to separate the effects of persistence from
‘‘true’’ contagion, in the sense that an effect due to a single
individual propagates to a remote individual along a series of
network ties, that we designed the concentrated seed experiment.
And as the results from that experiment make clear, neither
persistence nor even conditional cooperation (as demonstrated in
the cover seed design) are sufficient to generate contagion in this
sense. Given these results, we conclude that although the effects of
higher neighbor contributions may well persist for up to three
rounds, the most intuitive interpretation of the ‘‘three degrees of
influence’’ rule—namely that higher contributions spread from
individual to individual in a static network for up to three steps—is
not supported.
Discussion
Returning to our original motivation, theoretical arguments in
favor of an association between network structure and cooperation
invoke two related ideas: first, that individuals are conditional
cooperators, increasing their contributions in response to the
increased contributions of their neighbors; and second, that
positive effects of conditional cooperation should propagate
through the network via a process of contagion. In this paper,
we have tested the effects of network topology on contribution
levels in a standard public goods game, finding no significant
effects. In addition, we conducted two separate rounds of
experiments—one to test for the presence of conditional
cooperation, and the other to test for the possibility of positive
contagion. Although we do find strong evidence of conditional
cooperation, we do not find evidence of positive contagion in the
standard sense of multi-step propagation along a sequence of ties
in a static network.
Our explanation for these results is that the theoretical
arguments cited above emphasize the positive aspect of conditional
cooperation, yet conditional cooperation implies not only that
players increase their contributions in response to cooperative
Figure 8. The average pair-wise difference of the human contributions in each of the subgraphs pictured.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.g008
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response to defecting neighbors. Although it is the case that highly
clustered networks offer more opportunities for positive effects to
reinforce each other than random networks, they also offer more
opportunities for negative effects to reinforce each other as well.
By contrast, in random graphs where there is very little clustering,
neither cooperation nor defection get reinforced and seeds act as
influence blockers preventing either positive or negative influence
from propagating among neighbors.
As stated in the introduction, in the case of coordination games,
if node A chooses an action that results in a lack of coordination
with neighbor B, then B has a clear incentive to change its action.
In turn, if this results in a lack of coordination with C which is a
neighbor of B and not A, this can result in contagion. In a
cooperation setting, B need not change its action in response to A
because the incentives do not enforce such a tight coupling of
neighbors actions. This leads to an interesting open question—
under what theoretical conditions should one expect to see
contagion over networks with fixed neighbors? In demonstrating
that not all dynamic games on networks exhibit contagion we hope
that our findings will provoke new theoretical hypotheses along
these lines, as well as new experiments to test them.
Moreover, even in the absence of contagion, our observations
also show how an outside entity might stimulate cooperation in a
network by subsidizing targeted individuals to cooperate or by
inserting unconditionally cooperative players into the network. We
emphasize that unlike other known strategies for stimulating
cooperation, such as allowing punishment [5] or reward [8], or
Figure 9. Cooperating seeds in the concentrated seed experiments. The blue, filled-in nodes were used as seed nodes in the concentrated
arrangement (see text for details). Oval shaped nodes that are outlined in blue are directly connected to at least one seed node. Triangular nodes are
two hops from at least one seed node. In each topology two of the seeds in the concentrated arrangement were also seeds in the cover arrangement.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.g009
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change the game by giving players another action, but instead
exploits the network on which the game is being played. As Table 1
shows, in the cover experiments the positive intervention was cost-
effective in four out the five topologies. More specifically, the
expected cost of subsidizing players, i.e. the additional contribu-
tions of the four seeds over their average contribution in the no-
intervention case, was less than the total marginal increase in
contributions from the remaining twenty individuals. These results
therefore provide empirical support for earlier theoretical work
[47] which proposed that seeding or inducing cooperation among
focal actors may generate positive effects on the network. Our
work also suggests where to place the seed nodes for maximum
effect. The absence of positive contagion—along with the negative
marginal effect on neighbors of multiple unconditionally cooper-
ating seeds—implies that the impact of cooperative seeds is
maximized by spreading them widely across many groups, thereby
maximizing the total number of human players exposed directly to
seeds.
In concluding, we note that in addition to their substantive
relevance, the experiments discussed here also demonstrate the
possibility of web-based behavioral experiments involving the
simultaneous presence of many players (see also [44]). Although
experiments of this nature and scale have been conducted in
physical labs [24–27], web-based ‘‘virtual labs’’ exhibit two
important advantages over their physical counterparts: first,
experiments can be run faster and more efficiently (e.g. we ran
113 experiments costing roughly $1.50 per subject per experi-
ment); and second, although our panel size restricted the current
study to networks of n~24, in principle this limit can be raised
arbitrarily, allowing for the study of much larger networked
systems. The speed, efficiency, and scalability of web-based
experimentation should allow researchers to extend the current
study in numerous directions: how would contributions be affected
Figure 10. Contributions for concentrated-seed experiment. (A) The average contribution of human players neighboring 0, 1 or 2
cooperating seed nodes. (B) The average contribution of the human players 2 hops from 2 seed nodes compared to the average contribution of the
corresponding nodes in the all human experiments. In both panels error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.g010
Figure 11. Checking for the effects of learning. (A) Comparison on the Cycle topology with all human players between experiments conducted
early in our study and at the end of our study. (B) Average contribution levels as a function of how many times an individual has played.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836.g011
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providing players with feedback, or allowing players to rewire
their network ties? And how do all these effects scale with the size
and density of the network? In addressing these questions, and
others, we anticipate that web-based platforms like that provided
by AMT will become an increasingly valuable tool for under-
standing the dynamics of human cooperation, and for experimen-
tal social science in general.
Materials and Methods
This section provides additional details on the Investment
Game experiment, conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(AMT). All participants were recruited on AMT by posting a
HIT for the experiment, entitled ‘‘The Investment Game’’, a
neutral title that was accurate without disclosing the purpose of
the experiment. Before launching the experiment, we submitted
to and complied with Yahoo!’s internal human subjects review
process. A letter certifying the approval of our experiment has
been filed with PLoS One. All data collected in the experiment
could be associated only with participants’ Amazon Turker ID,
not with any personally-identifiable information; thus all players
remained anonymous.
Ethics Statement
Before participating, all subjects were required to read and
acknowledged the following terms of use agreement (equivalent to
an Informed Consent Statement).
The Investment Game Terms of Use. You will be paid
$0.50 as a base rate plus more depending on your ability to play
the game If you have any questions at any time, please contact:
Siddharth Suri at Yahoo! Research, 111 W. 40th St., New York,
NY, or by email at suri@yahoo-inc.com By clicking the ‘‘I Agree’’
button below you affirm that you have read and understood the
following Yahoo! Research Investment Game Terms of Use and
Investment Game description and agree to comply with and be
bound by its terms. YAHOO! RESEARCH INVESTMENT
GAME TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1. Welcome to the Yahoo! Research Investment Game (‘‘Proj-
ect’’). This Project is a game of skill, not a game of chance. By
participating in the Project you are entering into a legally
binding agreement with Yahoo!, Inc., (‘‘Yahoo!, ‘‘we,’’ ‘‘our,’’
and ‘‘us’’). This agreement is comprised solely of these Terms
and Conditions (‘‘Agreement’’ or ‘‘Terms’’), including anything
explicitly incorporated by reference. If you do not agree to
these Terms, please do not participate.
2. The Project is offered to individuals registered as ‘‘workers’’
with Amazon, Inc.’s ‘‘Mechanical Turk’’ service (http://www.
mturk.com/mturk/welcome).
3. Your participation in the Project as a worker is governed by
Amazon, Inc.’s Mechanical Turk’s conditions of use (http://
www.mturk.com/mturk/conditionsofuse) in addition to the
following Yahoo! terms:
(a) Description of Project. The Yahoo! Research Investment
Game is intended to collect data on how well people play this
game.
(b) Work Product/Ownership. You agree to perform the tasks
provided in the Project and to be compensated for the
completion of each task as set forth in C below. You also
agree that Yahoo!, and not You, shall own all work product
from your participation in the Project.
(c) Payment. You will be paid $0.50 plus a bonus depending on
your skill level for the game. All payments will be made to
You through the Mechanical Turk service as detailed in the
Mechanical Turk conditions of use.
(d) Relationship of the Parties. The Parties are independent
contractors. Nothing in these Terms shall be construed as
creating any agency, partnership, or other form of joint
enterprise between the Parties and neither Party may create
any obligations or responsibilities on behalf of the other
Party.
(e) Termination.
i. By You. You may terminate Your participation in the Project
by clicking the Return HIT button at any time.
ii. By Yahoo!. We may suspend or terminate the Project at any
time, with or without notice, for any reason or no reason. In
the event of such termination, Yahoo! will pay You for all
tasks fully completed by You prior to termination.
(f) Contact. If you have any questions at any time, please
contact Siddharth Suri at Yahoo! Research, 111 W. 40th St.,
New York, NY, or by email at suri@yahoo-inc.com
(g) Confidentiality. You will not disclose or use Yahoo!’s
Confidential Information. ‘‘Confidential Information’’
means any information disclosed or made available to You
by Yahoo!, directly or indirectly, whether in writing, orally
or visually, other than information that: (a) is or becomes
publicly known and generally available other than through
Your action or inaction or (b) was already in Your possession
(as documented by written records) without confidentiality
restrictions before you received it from Yahoo!. Confidential
Information includes, but is not limited to, all information
contained within the Project, these Terms, the Policies, and
any other technical or programming information Yahoo!
discloses or makes available to you.
(h) Indemnity. You will defend, indemnify and hold harmless
Yahoo! Inc., and its affiliated companies, (‘‘Indemnified
Parties’’) from and against any and all claims, liabilities,
losses, costs, and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’
fees, which the Indemnified Parties suffer as a result of claims
that arise from or relate to your activities under or in
connection with this Agreement, including but not limited to
claims that allege or arise from: (i) a violation a third party’s
right of privacy, or infringement of a third party’s copyright,
patent, trade secret, trademark, or other intellectual property
rights, (ii) any breach of your obligations, covenants,
warranties or representations as set forth in this Agreement,
including any breach of any applicable policies, (iii) any
violation of applicable laws, rules, and regulations by you,
including, without limitation, privacy laws, and (iv) any
breach of this Agreement. You shall not enter into any
settlement that affects any Indemnified Party’s rights or
interest, admit to any fault or liability on behalf of any
Indemnified Party, or incur any financial obligation on
behalf of any Indemnified Party without that Indemnified
Party’s prior written approval.
(i) No Warranty. YOU EXPRESSLY AGREE TO THE
FOLLOWING WARRANTY DISCLAIMER. YOU ARE
PARTICIPATING IN THE PROJECT AT YOUR OWN
RISK. YOU REPRESENT AND WARRANT THAT BY
PARTICIPATING IN THIS PROJECT THAT YOU
WILL COMPLY WITH ALL APPLICABLE LAWS. THE
PROJECT AND EVERYTHING PROVIDED UNDER
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DOES NOT WARRANT THAT THE PROJECT WILL
OPERATE UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR-FREE.
YAHOO AND ITS LICENSORS ARE NOT RESPON-
SIBLE FOR ANY CONTENT PROVIDED HEREUN-
DER. TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW, YA-
HOO! AND ITS LICENSORS MAKE NO WARRANTY
OF ANY KIND, WHETHER EXPRESS, IMPLIED,
STATUTORY OR OTHERWISE, INCLUDING WITH-
OUT LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF MERCHANT-
ABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE,
AND NONINFRINGEMENT. YAHOO! MAKES NO
WARRANTY AND NO REPRESENTATION ABOUT
THE AMOUNT OF MONEY YOU WILL EARN
THROUGH THE PROGRAM. THIS WARRANTY
DISCLAIMER SHALL APPLY TO THE MAXIMUM
EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW.
(j) Limitation of Liability. YOU EXPRESSLY AGREE TO
THE FOLLOWING LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.
YAHOO! WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST
PROFITS, COSTS OF PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTI-
TUTE GOODS OR SERVICES, OR FOR ANY OTHER
INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, EXEMPLARY,
PUNITIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARIS-
ING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THIS
AGREEMENT, HOWEVER CAUSED, AND UNDER
WHATEVER CAUSE OF ACTION OR THEORY OF
LIABILITY BROUGHT, EVEN IF YAHOO! HAS BEEN
ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAM-
AGES. YAHOO! WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR DIRECT
DAMAGES IN EXCESS OF ANY AMOUNT THAT
YAHOO! HAS ALREADY PAID TO YOU FOR YOUR
PARTICIPATION IN THE PROJECT. IF YOU ARE
DISSATISFIED WITH ANY ASPECT OF THE PROJ-
ECT, OR WITH ANY OF THESE TERMS OF USE,
YOUR SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS TO
DISCONTINUE YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE
PROJECT. This limitation of liability shall apply to the
maximum extent permitted by law.
(k) No Public Statements. You may not issue any press release
or other public statement regarding the Agreement, Yahoo!,
and/or Yahoo! Inc.s affiliates, or partners or advertisers
without the prior written consent of an authorized person at
Yahoo!.
I AGREE
Participant Instructions
After accepting the HIT and agreeing to the terms of use,
participants were provided with the following instructions (adapted
from [32]).
Welcome to the Investment Game! Because the amount of
money you can earn depends on your decisions in the game, it is
important that you read these instructions with care. At the end of
the instructions there is a quiz to ensure that you understand the
instructions. You will not be paid for the HIT unless you correctly
answer these questions.
Overview. In the Investment Game you will be placed in a
network with 23 other Turkers; however, you will only ‘‘see’’ a
subset of the total network-those players to whom you are
connected directly. These players will be called your ‘‘neighbors’’.
Both the total network and your neighbors will remain fixed
throughout the game.
Once the network is populated with Turkers, the game will
proceed over the course of 10 ‘‘rounds’’. During each round you
and your neighbors (i.e. the Turkers directly connected to you in
the network) will choose how much to contribute to an abstract
project. Then this project generates a ‘‘payoff’’ that will then be
split equally among you and those who are directly connected to
you. Your total payoff for the game is the sum of your payoffs from
each round.
During the game we will not report your earnings in terms of
dollars and cents but rather in terms of points. At the end of the
game the total amount of points you have earned will be converted
to dollars at the rate of 1 point = 2 cents. The amount you earn
from the game will be the bonus for this HIT. You will earn the
base rate of 50 cents for this HIT by correctly answering the quiz
at the end of these instructions.
How the game works
1. In each round we give you an ‘‘endowment’’ of 10 points.
2. You decide how many points you want to contribute to the
project by typing a number between 0 and 10 in the input field
and then clicking the submit button. Please note that by
deciding how many points to contribute to the project, you also
decide how many points you keep for your self, this is (10 - your
contribution) points. Also note that once you have submitted
your contribution you cannot go back and change it.
3. In the first two rounds you have 45 seconds to make you
contribution. In the remaining rounds you have 30 seconds. If
you do not make a contribution before the end of a round, the
system will make one for you and you will not earn any points
for that round.
4. Your income from each round consists of two parts:
(a) the points which you have kept for yourself (‘‘income from
points kept’’).
(b) ‘‘income from the project’’, which is 0.4 x the total
contribution that you and your neighbors made to the
project.
Your income in points from a round is therefore: Income
from points kept + Income from the project = (10 - your
contribution to the project) + 0.4*(total contributions you
and your neighbors made to the project)
5. The income of each person in the network (including your
neighbors) is calculated in the same way.
Four Examples of Payoffs
1. Suppose you have four (4) neighbors, and each of you
contributes the maximum allowable of 10 points. The sum of
the contributions you and your neighbors (those who are
directly connected to you) is 50 points, and so each member of
the group receives an income from the project of: 0.4*50=20
points. Meanwhile your income from points kept = 0 (because
you did not keep any), and so your total income = 0+20=20
points.
2. Alternatively, suppose that each player contributes two (2)
points. Then the total contribution to the project is 10 points,
and each member of the group receives an income from the
project of: 0.4*10=4 points. Because you contributed two of
these points then your income from points kept is eight (8), and
your total income = 8+4=12 points.
3. Next, say you contribute two (2) points and all your neighbors
contribute ten (10) points, the total contribution is 42 points,
and the income that each player receives from the project is
0.4*42=16.8 points. Because you contributed two (2) points,
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8+16.8=24.8 points.
4. Finally, say you contribute ten (10) points, and all your
neighbors contribute two (2) points, the total contribution is 18
points, and the income that each player receives from the
project is 0.4*18=7.2 points. Because you contributed ten (10)
points, your kept income is zero (0) points and your total
income = 0+7.2=7.2 points.
Important Points to Note
1. For each point that you decide to keep for yourself, your
income for that round will increase by one point.
2. For each point you contribute to the project, the total
contribution to the project will rise by one point, and your
income from the project will rise by 0.4*1=0.4 points.
3. For each point you contribute to the project, the income of
your neighbors will rise by 0.4 points each. For example, if you
have 4 neighbors then a one point contribution by you will
raise the total income of you and your neighbors by 5*0.4=2.0
points.
4. Finally, say you contribute ten (10) points, and all your
neighbors contribute two (2) points, the total contribution is 18
points, and the income that each player receives from the
project is 0.4*18=7.2 points. Because you contributed ten (10)
points, your kept income is zero (0) points and your total
income = 0+7.2=7.2 points.
Participant Quiz
Finally, participants were required to pass a quiz, thus
demonstrating that they had understood the instructions.
Quiz. To make sure you have read and understood the
instructions, you must answer the following questions correctly. If
you answer any questions incorrectly, you will get a second
chance. If you answer a question incorrectly twice, you will not be
allowed to play the game and will not receive payment for the
HIT. The answers to all of the questions below are in terms of
points. Please accept the HIT before beginning to fill out the form.
In questions 1–4, assume you have 5 neighbors and you and
your neighbors have an endowment of 10 points each.
1. If nobody (including yourself) contributes any points to the
project what would your total income be?
2. If everyone (including yourself) contributes all 10 points to the
project, would your total income be?
3. Say together your neighbors contribute a total of 25 points to
the project.
(a) If you do not contribute any points to the project what would
your total income be?
(b) If you contribute an additional 5 points to the project what
would your total income be?
4. Say you contribute 8 points to the project.
(a) What would be your income if your neighbors contributed a
total of 12 points to the project?
(b) What would be your income if your neighbors contributed a
total of 32 points to the project?
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